Most people are familiar with paper ballots. Paper ballots, in concept, represent physical, countable votes written on paper and placed into a box. While implementation differs, this model works well for basic election security study.
When ballots move out of sight, we entrust their integrity to the few remaining in their presence—typically chosen by Local and State Boards, who may assemble a corrupt chain of custody and manipulate the ballots. If the ballots have any force as an official record—if we allow recounts—then they are their own audit trail, which means there is no audit trail.
Because of the lack of an audit trail, we must count paper ballots in view of the voters. This provides some difficulty with ranked ballots: while simple vote counts fully describe a set of non-ranked ballots, ranked ballots require an exponentially-growing body of information as candidate size and vote count grows. Final precinct counts cannot sum to produce final total counts.
With paper ballots, we are chiefly concerned with the integrity of the ballot box, mainly with ballot stuffing and ballot forging. These attacks typically come from organized election officials rather than individual voters.
Prior to voting, election officials open the ballot box and demonstrate its emptiness to observers. This prevents ballot box stuffing—pre-loading the ballot box with votes. Visibly counting votes is another method, ensuring that the number of votes in the ballot box matches the number of votes observed.
Paper ballots require anti-forgery features, or else an agent can pre-fill several forged ballots and slip them into the box when casting their own vote. Election judges often place a tear-off tab into a visible ballot count box and verify that the number of tabs matches the number of ballots distributed to voters.
Ballot boxes are sealed in a tamper-evident manner, and never taken from public view without attendance by election judges of opposing interest. This allegedly prevents ballot tampering, but in reality would allow the judges to agree to trade tampering opportunities, such as to win various elections which are more-meaningful to each. In truth, election judges must count ballots before removing the boxes from view, or else we cannot guarantee integrity.
Finally, election judges hand-count ballots, announcing each vote for the observers. This allows verification of figures from each polling location, as observers can record and publish the observed count. This secondary-source record acts as an audit trail, although it’s trivial to record forged numbers; prohibiting the exclusion of any members of the public from observing the election makes such forgery less-likely.
An Assisted Hand-Count Process
A fast, assisted hand-count process can improve on the inherent difficulties with hand-counted paper ballot security by rapidly counting, recording, and correcting a digital representation in view of the public observers.
The fast assisted-hand-count process uses a non-networked computer with a camera to image several ballots at once. Large monitors display the ballot images and the information recorded, and election judges modify the interpreted counts when they are inaccurate. All of this occurs in public view immediately at the end of a polling day.
A second, Internet-connected computer with a second, large display can stream results out to the public at large. This second computer uses a camera to read QR codes at the top-left of the screen, which encode the ballot page and the interpreted contents. Election judges only make adjustments on the official count machine.
This broadcasting system may also have its own camera to photograph ballots, or it may read a rapid succession of large QR codes carrying the original image file of the ballots. In the latter case, a real-time, official count can be searchable and viewable during counting, barely ten seconds behind real-time.
At any time during counting, observers may object to the ballot counts for a particular ballot page or as a whole. Objections are noted and change an indicator from green to red; the counting process pauses, the election judge retrieves the ballot image, and the ballot data is verified. At the end of counting, the physical ballots are compared to these objected ballot images as a final check.
This process, with images of ballots taken in parallel to counting, can image and count 2,500 ballots in roughly 45 minutes at 10 seconds per set of 10 ballots. The ability of public observers to record and to later review protects the integrity of the count and provides a form of mutual attestation. Objection to prior ballot pages can come several minutes later, without disrupting the counting process, allowing accelerated counting.